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Many Christians accept an account of the afterlife according to which the
determining factor in the Divine judgment is the state of the person’s soul
at death—I’ll call this account the “last moment view.”  As far as I know,
the clearest statement of the last moment view is in Catholic teaching,
according to which, if a person dies in a state of mortal sin, then he is con-
signed to the “eternal death of hell.”1 I will argue that the “eternalist”
account of time is incompatible with the last moment view, and that, there-
fore, those who accept the last moment view are committed to “presen-
tism.”  (I’ll sketch out the meaning of this terminology in the paper’s first
section.)  The main target of my arguments will be eternalism in combina-
tion with the ontological view known as “perdurance,” but, as I’ll briefly
show towards the close of the paper, “endurantist” eternalists shall fare no
better (or no worse, as the case may be) against my arguments than eter-
nalists of the perdurantist persuasion.  
I
Eternalism—the claim that all times are ontologically on par; that the
present is no more real than the past or the future—stands in contrast to
presentism, according to which the past is no more, and the future is not
yet; only the present exists.2 Thus, the dispute between eternalists and pre-
sentists is a dispute about the ontological status of times other than the pre-
sent.  Presentists think that only the present exists, while eternalists think
all times exist.  Another way of putting the presentist thesis is that presen-
tists believe that only those things that exist now, exist at all (and further,
that objects exemplify only those properties they exemplify now).
Dinosaurs did exist once, but they don’t exist now, so they don’t exist at all.
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Many Christians believe that persons who, at the moment of death, are in
rebellion from God, are damned, while those in right relationship with God
are saved.  This is what, for instance, the Catholic teaching regarding the fate
of those who die in mortal sin amounts to.  In this paper, I argue that this “last
moment view” is incompatible with a popular theory of time known as eter-
nalism, according to which all times are equally real.  If that’s right, then those
who accept the last moment view are committed to an alternative theory of
time known as presentism.
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Eternalists agree, of course, that dinosaurs don’t exist now (or, if they don’t
agree, that’s not because they’re eternalists, but because they have some
additional peculiarity), but they do believe that dinosaurs exist.  They exist
in the past, which is just as real as the future, which is just as real as the
present.  
A helpful comparison is often drawn between presentism and actual-
ism.  Just as the presentist thinks that only those things that exist now exist
(or that an object exemplifies only those properties that it exemplifies now),
the actualist holds that only those things that exist in the actual world exist.
One can, similarly, compare the eternalist with the possibilist.  Just as the
eternalist believes that objects that don’t exist now nevertheless exist, possi-
bilists believe that objects that don’t exist here (i.e. in the actual world) nev-
ertheless exist. 
We turn now to the persistence issue.  Endurantists and perdurantists
agree that (at least some) objects persist, or last, over time.3 (For example, I
existed in 1975, and I exist now: I have persisted.)  They disagree about how
objects persist.  Endurantists hold that persisting objects are wholly present
at all times in which they exist.  Perdurantists believe that persisting objects
are, rather, spread out in time: they have temporal parts, and are not whol-
ly present at any given moment of time.  So assume that perdurantism is
true: what accounts for my existing in both 1975 and 2002 is that I have a
temporal part in 1975 and a temporal part in 2002; I am made up of all of
my temporal parts.  To understand what this means, just consider your
spatial parts.  What accounts for you being both in water and in air (at the
same time) is that you have a part (your foot) in the water, and a part (your
head) in the air.  The perdurantist claims that temporal parts are just like
spatial parts.  Just as spatially extended objects have spatial parts in differ-
ent places, temporally extended objects have temporal parts in different
times. 
Many philosophers accept perdurantism because of various metaphysi-
cal puzzles. One of the best known of these puzzles is the problem of tem-
porary intrinsics, which David Lewis calls the “decisive objection against
endurance.”4
Persisting things change their intrinsic properties.  For instance
shape: when I sit, I have a bent shape; when I stand, I have a straight-
ened shape.  Both shapes are temporary intrinsic properties; I have
them only some of the time.  How is such change possible? 
The trouble here, Lewis thinks, is that it is a contradiction for one thing
to have both the property of sitting and the property of standing.  Lewis
believes that the only plausible way to solve the problem is by invoking
perdurance, according to which it is not one thing that has these contradic-
tory properties, but, rather, it’s different things that have them—one tem-
poral part has the property sitting, and another has the property standing.
Presentists, as you would expect, do not find this objection decisive.  As
we’ll see, the problem of temporary intrinsics is importantly relevant to my
argument below, so I will briefly outline a good presentist reply to the
problem.  Look again at the problem: if it is possible for persisting objects
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to change, then it is possible that a persisting object O is F, and that in the
past, O was ~F.  Thus, it seems, O is both F and ~F.  And that’s not good.
Presentists avoid this problem by insisting that an object exemplifies only
the properties it has at the present.  There is no contradiction, then, because
O, if it is now F, is no longer ~F, even though it once was.5 This will be
important in what follows.     
It is, I think, relatively uncontroversial that perdurance entails eternal-
ism.6 To see why, imagine that presentism is true.  Then, if perdurance is
true and I am the sum of all my temporal parts—but only the present part
exists—I am not a persisting thing at all, but simply an instantaneous blip.
After all, how could I have parts that don’t exist?7 But perdurance is sup-
posed to be a theory of persistence, so it isn’t compatible with presentism.
Thus, not only do we see that perdurance entails eternalism, we also see
that presentism entails endurance.  
It’s not, however, entirely clear that endurance and eternalism are incom-
patible.  Indeed, some very good philosophers believe these doctrines are
compatible.  I’m inclined to think they are mistaken, but we needn’t settle
that dispute here.8 We’ll put that combination of views aside, and return to
it later.  For the time being, I will argue against perdurance—on the under-
standing that perdurance entails eternalism.9 Also, until further notice,
when I speak of endurance, I shall mean endurance combined with presen-
tism.  Once I have shown that the last moment view rules out perdurantist
eternalism, I shall then briefly take up the question of whether endurantist
eternalism can escape my arguments.  I don’t think it can.     
II
Those who accept the last moment view believe that a person’s moral state
at the time of his death is the determining factor in his fate—God assigns
people their place in either heaven or hell on the basis of his judgment of
the state of the soul at death.  The Catholic Church, again, teaches that one
who dies with unconfessed mortal sin on his soul is damned.  Now consid-
er of a fairly standard complaint about the Catholic teaching on mortal sin
and damnation.    
Imagine that Wendy has been a good and faithful Catholic all her life,
but that one day she returns home from work to find her husband in
bed with the mailman.  Wendy kills her husband with the very heavy
mailbag she happens to find handy.  Let’s stipulate that this is a mor-
tal sin.  (It meets the three conditions of grave matter, full knowledge
and deliberate consent.10)  Then, Wendy, still in a rage, runs to her car
and drives away, but soon crashes her car and dies.
The objector closes the story by asking: “do you really think God would
send someone who had lived such a very good life to hell for just commit-
ting one sin right at the end?”  The response Catholics tend to offer is:
This person, by committing a mortal sin, has willfully separated her-
self from life in Christ.  She has decided to sever her right relation-
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ship with God.  We can lament the fact that she died just when she
did, and not three hours earlier, or three hours later, after repenting
and receiving sacramental absolution.  But, she did die in mortal sin,
and so she must bear the burden of her free decision.  No one, after
all, has a right to go to Heaven.
The responder may not himself be satisfied with that answer.  The doc-
trine of hell is troubling, and deeply mysterious; pat answers like this one
don’t really help us come to terms with the enormity of what’s at stake.
But that doesn’t mean the pat answer isn’t right, as far as it goes.  What the
answer brings out to the objector is that the person who dies in a state of
mortal sin is in that state when she stands before God.  It’s true that there
was a time when she was not in that state; and if she had lived longer, she
might have gotten out of it.  But at the time of her death, she is in mortal
sin—she has rejected God.11
Consider, however, how the pat answer would go if it were being
voiced by a perdurantist.  The perdurantist has to claim that the reason we
say that Wendy died in mortal sin is that the temporal part that died was
in mortal sin.  But now consider what it is that stands before God for judg-
ment: it’s one of Wendy’s temporal parts—not Wendy as a whole.  That’s
just the perdurantist view.  But, also on that view, the temporal part stand-
ing before God is not in any way ontologically privileged.  The temporal
parts that Wendy had prior to her mortal sin and subsequent death are just
as real as the one that is standing before Him for judgment.
The problem is obvious.  Since all of Wendy’s temporal parts are onto-
logically on par, it is grossly unjust for God to arbitrarily pick only one as
the standard of judgment and ignore the others.  There is nothing special
about that last temporal part of her earthly life, other than that it happens
to be the one that dies.  The perdurantist view entails that Wendy’s tempo-
ral part that immediately followed her baptism is just as real as the one that
died in mortal sin.  What could justify God’s ignoring Wendy’s parts that
are in a state of grace, and paying attention only to the one(s) in mortal sin?
This is surely a problem for the perdurantist.
I spoke above of “the last temporal part of Wendy’s earthly life,” and
perhaps implied that it is this temporal part that is judged.  Nothing impor-
tant in my argument depends upon whether God’s judgment actually
occurs at the very moment of death, or at some later time.  If the former,
then it is of course the last temporal part of our earthly life that is judged.
If the latter, then some later temporal part is judged.  This isn’t a problem,
since, when a person commits a mortal sin, her subsequent temporal parts
will all be in mortal sin until the sin is repented of.  And according to the
last moment view, the time for repentance ends at death.  So, the crucial
point is that whatever part is judged is in precisely the same condition—in
terms of its relationship with God—as that last living temporal part.  For
ease of expression, I will use the term “last temporal part” in this paper,
but I mean this locution to be open to the interpretation that it is not one’s
last earthly temporal part that is judged, but some later one that is neces-
sarily in the same moral state as that last earthly one.    
It is also, perhaps, worthwhile to note here that it makes absolutely no
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difference to the person who holds the last moment view when the person
got into the state in which he died.  That is, if, instead of dying immediate-
ly after killing her husband, Wendy had lived another 60 years, and then
died without repenting for that sin, she would have died in a state of mor-
tal sin.  Conversely, if Wendy had committed the murder, repented imme-
diately, and then died in the next instant, she would have died in the state
of grace.  The proximity of death to sin is immaterial.
So, with these points well in hand, let us return to the argument.  At first
sight, it might appear that the endurantist faces the same problem that I’ve
pressed against the perdurantist.  After all, I’ve said that Wendy had lived
most of her life as a faithful Catholic.  Why should God ignore all that time
and focus only on Wendy’s last moment?  This seems just as unfair and
arbitrary.  But it isn’t.  Assume endurantism is true.  So when Wendy dies
and stands before God for judgment, Wendy is standing before God: not
part of Wendy—just Wendy.  God could choose no other part as the stan-
dard of judgment; no other part exists.  
I will soon discuss a number of ways that eternalists might respond to
this problem.  Before I take up those responses, however, I want to take
some care to be perfectly clear about how different things really are for the
presentist and the eternalist.
Here it is imperative that we keep clear what serves as the standard of
judgment.  On the last moment view, it is the state of the soul that is the
determining factor.  Thus, if the soul is in a state of grace, the person is
saved, and if the soul is in a state of mortal sin, the person is damned.12 If,
however, we were to think of the determining factor in the judgment as
something like “facts” about persons, or propositions about persons, then
it would appear that presentism is just as difficult to reconcile with last-
momentism as is eternalism.  Assume that the judgment is based on facts
about the person, rather than on the state of the person’s soul.  Then, on the
eternalist view, there is the fact that ten minutes before her death, Wendy
was in a state of grace, and there’s the fact that at the moment of her death,
Wendy was in a state of mortal sin.  Both of these facts are equally real.
Now, I’ve argued that, if eternalism is true, it would be unjust for God
to condemn Wendy on the basis of just the last moment of her life.  But,
still assuming that the judgment is based on facts, we can see that the pre-
sentist admits just the same things that the eternalist admits.  The presen-
tist does not deny that there is the fact that ten minutes ago, Wendy was in
a state of grace, and that at the moment of her death, she was in the state of
mortal sin.  So how is the presentist any better off than the eternalist?
This objection is premised on the false assumption that God judges facts
instead of people.  Once that assumption is rejected, the presentist’s advan-
tage becomes quite clear.  If the standard of judgment is the state of the
soul (i.e., whether it has the property in a state of mortal sin or in a state of
grace), and the only state of a person’s soul that exists is the state of the soul
at the last moment, then it’s obvious that there is no arbitrariness in select-
ing that state as the standard.  What other state could be selected?  Think
back to the presentist reply to the problem of temporary intrinsics.  The
reason there is no contradiction in saying that Wendy was in a state of sin,
and is in a state of grace, is that she exemplifies only the properties she has
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at the present.  That state of sin is gone, and so does not contradict the pre-
sent state of grace.  Here, the comparison of presentism to actualism
becomes quite illuminating.  In an important sense, the fact that at a past
time Wendy was in a state of sin is no more morally relevant than is the
fact that in another possible world, Wendy is a child pornographer.  There
is, plausibly, this fact about her, but it is not taken into account in her judg-
ment.  So the presentist is able to make sense of the justice of God’s judging
the state of the soul at its last moment.
The perdurantist cannot so easily avoid the problem of the last moment
view, for on her view, God has a vast assemblage of states from which he
could select when he judges someone’s soul.  The person’s whole life is
stretched out in time.  And the fact that God just picks one moment of that
life as his standard of judgment seems disturbingly arbitrary.  Think again
of the comparison between eternalism and possibilism.  Here, we’ll take up
the modal realist version of possibilism made notorious by David Lewis.
Suppose that modal realism were true, and Wendy were a transworld indi-
vidual.  (Of course, Lewis himself denies the existence of transworld indi-
viduals in favor of counterpart theory, but that’s not the point.)  If Wendy
were a transworld individual, and modal realism were true, then she
would have as parts all the Wendies in all the worlds in which she existed,
just as, according to perdurantists, Wendy is made up of all her temporal
parts, which exist at all times at which she exists.  Now imagine that God
judges this transworld Wendy based on her moral status in one, arbitrarily
selected world, completely ignoring her other parts.  That would obviously
be unjust.  It is my contention that this grossly unjust situation exactly par-
allels the view of the perdurantist last momentist.  
Even if this is all granted, however, the fact that Wendy died when she
did, and not later or earlier, might still be pressed against the endurantist as
a problem for God’s justice: how can the endurantist explain how a loving
God could let Wendy die just at the time when she was in mortal sin?  Why
didn’t he let her die earlier, or prolong her life until she repented?  That
question is difficult—if not impossible—to answer well.  So this objection
might seem to balance the scales; my argument shows that it’s difficult to
reconcile perdurantism and the last moment view, but this objection shows
that it’s difficult to reconcile endurantism and the last moment view.  
That’s not quite right, though.  This objection, if it applies at all, applies
equally to anyone who accepts the last moment view—endurantist or per-
durantist.  The perdurantist last momentist also has to explain why God
would allow one of Wendy’s mortally sinful temporal parts to die when
there are so many that aren’t in mortal sin.  So the objection I raise to per-
durantism is different than, and in addition to, this one.  
Thus far, the argument stands—perdurantism is, prima facie, incompati-
ble with the last moment view.  In the next section, I will consider several
further possible replies to my argument.
III
One’s first inclination might be to respond to my argument by postulating
that even on the perdurantist view, God judges Wendy, and not just one of
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her temporal parts: he looks at all of her temporal parts (that is, he looks at
her) and weighs those in the state of grace against those in mortal (and
original?) sin.  Then he decides her fate.  
This avoids the arbitrariness problem, to be sure.  But the “solution”
unambiguously rejects the last moment view, and so is no threat to my
argument, which quite openly relies upon the assumption of the truth of
the last moment view.  It hardly counts against my argument that it can be
undermined by the denial of one of its presuppositions.  The truth of the
last moment view is not on the table here.  
However, this solution can be adjusted: indeed it has to be adjusted if it
is to work even on a perdurantist view.  For how could St. Dismas—the
“good thief”—have been saved, as we know he was, when he had a whole
lifetime of evil temporal parts, and just a few good temporal parts?  Surely,
any “weighing” account of the afterlife would have to consign St. Dismas
to hell.  The only way for the present solution to avoid sending St.
Dismas—and many others who experienced “deathbed conversions”—to
hell, is for it to assign some special weight to the last temporal part; but
that’s precisely what it is so difficult for a perdurantist to do.  
If it’s possible to put together a “weighing account” according to which
the last temporal part is decisive despite being ontologically on par with
the rest, then my argument fails.  There are five ways one might try to
assign special weight to the last moment. 
First, one could claim that, despite St. Dismas’s lifetime of sin, the one
moment of grace at the end is sufficient to outweigh all the evil.  The spe-
cial weight is accorded to the last moment not in virtue of its being the last
moment, but simply in virtue of the overwhelming weight of God’s grace.  
This claim has a tug to it, but it cannot be right.  For consider a man who
lives his whole life—say 72 years—in sin, except for two weeks around his
30th birthday, when he had a genuine conversion experience.  However,
like the seed that fell on the rocky soil, this man’s faith quickly dried up
and died.  The man went back to his life of sin, repudiated Christ, and
never repented again.  If this scenario is possible—and as far as I can tell,
anyone who accepts the last moment view would think it is—then the pro-
posed solution cannot work.  For the weight of grace during the two weeks
of this man’s discipleship should overwhelm the lifetime of sin, just as the
weight of grace in St. Dismas’s last moment overcomes the lifetime of sin.
But, in the case of our 72 year-old, it doesn’t.  So it can’t in the case of St.
Dismas, either.  
Secondly, perhaps the last temporal part ought to be assigned special
weight specifically because at that moment, the person knows he is ready-
ing himself to die and face judgment.  This objection claims, then, that (e.g.)
St. Dismas knew he was dying, and, facing his death, decided to recognize
his sin and ask for God’s forgiveness through the mediation of Jesus
Christ.  The special weight is not assigned to the last moment simply in
virtue of its being the last moment, but rather in virtue of its being recog-
nized as the last moment.
This objection may have some force in cases where the person sees his
death coming.  But what do we say about a person who is struck down
without any warning?  Consider Alfred, a 30-year-old man who has a heart
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attack and simply drops down dead, without having had any way of
knowing what was about to happen.  Can Alfred’s last temporal part be
accorded special weight in his judgment?  Not for the reason proposed
above, at any rate. 
Third, one could speculate that, in cases like Alfred’s, there is a
“moment of clarity” when the dying person is given one last chance to turn
to God: such moments have been suggested with respect to, for example,
unbaptized babies, who I take it, are thought to receive some kind of
infused knowledge which allows them to give or withhold their informed
consent.13 This proposal suggests that it only appears that Alfred has died
without any warning, but in fact, at the very moment of his death, God
offered him a last chance to repent of his sins.  Presumably, someone who
is offered such a last chance would also know it as a last chance, so this
proposal successfully explains why the last temporal part can fairly be
accorded decisive weight. 
However, if someone is going to take up the moment of clarity line, he’ll
have to hold that God extends this chance to everyone.  After all, the last
moment view is supposed to be true for everyone.  So if we render it com-
patible with perdurantism by means of this moment of clarity line, we’ll
have to say that, in fairness, everyone gets this “last chance.”  
Some might take the resultant certainty of having such a last chance to
be a comfort—but it certainly isn’t the picture of Divine judgment that
those who hold the last moment view generally seek to inculcate.  We
believe that we ought to be sober and watchful:  “You also must be ready;
for the Son of man is coming at an hour you do not expect.”  (Luke 12:40.14)
What could the point of such teaching be, if the solution under considera-
tion is correct?  Such a “comforting” solution isn’t in conformity with the
Gospel.  It allows people to postpone repentance until the last minute.  This
is not the view of our need to be converted that our Lord preached.  He
was quite clear that we must be prepared at all times—again, the Son of
man is coming at an hour we do not expect.
A fourth suggestion.  I’ve just argued that the Gospel tells us to be ready.
What if this warning itself justifies God in judging only the last temporal
part?  That is, since God has revealed to us that he will judge us based on
the state of our soul at our last moment, and since he has revealed to us that
we need always to be ready for our last moment, it is just for him to judge
us based solely on our last temporal part.  God has laid down the law, and
it is not for us to question it.  This objection, I think, has the most force of the
objections I’ve considered.  However, it faces a problem of its own.
God could surely lay down the law that he’ll judge us based solely on
the moral status of our last temporal part; he could just as well lay down
the law that he’ll judge us based solely on the moral status of one of our
temporal parts he chooses entirely at random.  He could have made the
law this: when a person comes before God for judgment, God blindfolds
St. Peter and asks him to point at one of that person’s temporal parts;
whichever one is picked is the one God bases his judgment on.  If that were
the way God ran things—even if he had revealed that process to us in
advance—we’d still think that there was something terribly wrong with
the process.  I don’t think it’s any different if God lays down the law that,
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instead of randomly choosing some part in the person’s life, he’ll just pick
the last one every time.  
Here we must return to the very first objection I raised against my
claim: that the perdurantist is in no worse shape than the endurantist.  If
it’s not just (assuming perdurance) for God to look at only the last tempo-
ral part and none of the others, how can it be just (assuming endurance) for
God only to look at Wendy only in the state in which she ended her life,
and at no other time?  Why shouldn’t he consider all the time she spent in
a state of grace?  
The answer is the same as before.  Again, it’s because there just isn’t any
other state for him to look at.  Those times are gone.  There’s just Wendy.
The “be ready” law makes perfect sense in the context of endurantism,
since there is nothing arbitrary about it.  God tells us to be ready because
he’ll judge us based on the state of our soul at the last moment: the reason
he makes that choice is that there is nothing else there for him to judge.
But the “be ready” law isn’t just when combined with perdurantism.  We
want to know why God would think it fair to ignore all those other, equal-
ly real, parts and look only at one.  
The final attempt to put decisive weight on the last temporal part is this.
What if the last moment can be weighed more heavily than the rest
because it is the state towards which all the others lead?  Time moves from
earlier to later, so one’s last temporal part is the end of one’s life story.
Since it has this character as the end to which the others lead, it might be
thought to be peculiarly special.  I suppose the objection might be under-
stood as making the last temporal part into something like an Aristotelian
final cause.
This objection fails because it just seems wrong to think that somehow
Wendy’s whole life was leading up to her death in a car wreck immediate-
ly after the commission of a mortal sin.  Surely, it is entirely possible that
Wendy have died in a car wreck on her way home, in which case she
wouldn’t have walked in on her husband’s liaison, wouldn’t have killed
him, and so wouldn’t have died in mortal sin.  Such an ending isn’t incon-
sistent with Wendy’s story—indeed, given that I’ve said that Wendy lived
her whole life as a faithful Catholic, it’s the kind of ending that we’d be
much more likely to expect.  If we want to retain a sufficiently robust
appreciation for God’s ability to do wonders in people’s lives, we have to
reject the idea that a life is tending inexorably in one or another direction.
Or, rather, though we might admit that a life surely tends in one direction,
that tendency is not in any sense a guarantee of the kind of ending that we
would expect.  But it seems to me that in order to invest the last moment
with the kind of weight one would need to invest it with to get the objec-
tion to work, one would have to see that last moment as the one fixed point
towards which all others were progressing.  That can’t be. 
One final objection that might be raised to my argument is the follow-
ing.  I have consistently spoken of sinners being damned—my focus, thus,
has been on God’s judgment of sinners, to the effect that they merit damna-
tion.  This way of seeing damnation has been called a “retributivist” view.
In Jonathan Kvanvig’s formulation, the Retribution Thesis is “The justifica-
tion for hell is retributive in nature, hell being constituted to mete out pun-
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ishment to those whose earthly lives and behavior warrant it.”15 This
Thesis is not universally accepted in Christendom.  C.S. Lewis, for exam-
ple, has quite famously argued for what Kvanvig calls the Self-
Incarceration Thesis, according to which “an eternal stay in hell is the
direct result only of the choices one makes, rather than a result imposed by
some outside power such as God.”16 The self-incarceration thesis might
help a perdurantist last momentist avoid charging God with injustice.
After all, if this is the way things work, then God doesn’t unjustly con-
demn people to hell on the basis of just their last temporal part, because the
people do that on their own.
For assume that a non-retributivist view of hell is correct, according to
which it is not the case that God condemns sinners to hell, but, rather, it is
that sinners freely turn away from God.  The perdurantist non-retributivist
might say that eternal separation from God is due to a free choice made by
a person (or, rather, made by some temporal parts of a person) sometime
before the moment of her death, in which all the following parts concur.
Thus, the eternal separation is not based on God’s decision to judge the last
temporal part, but solely on the free decision of the person.  So there is no
unfairness or arbitrariness that can be attributed to God.
The non-retributivist view of hell is attractive, but there is a problem
with this objection.  Before I turn to that problem, I need to make a theolog-
ical point.  Non-retributivism may not be consistent with the way the
Church has traditionally understood the judgment.17 The Church has
always held that God judges the person based on the state of his soul at his
last moment, but non-retributivism denies that there is any judgment.
Instead, the damned freely choose to separate themselves from God.
(Though, presumably, God concurs with the sinner’s wishes, and does not
violate his free decision to eternally separate himself from God.)  Now,
surely, the last-momentist (or, at least, the Catholic last-momentist) wants
to affirm that God predestines nobody to hell, and that therefore the sinner
does indeed freely separate himself from God.18 But that free separation
occurs at the time of the mortal sin (though it is at least implicitly reaf-
firmed in each succeeding moment at which the sinner fails to repent)—
not at the moment of judgment.  In short, I’m not sure non-retributivism is
consistent with Catholic teaching, so many believers in the last moment
view will likely not be moved by this objection.
Despite worries about the larger picture of the last things, it remains
entirely possible to accept the last moment view, understood as the claim
that one’s eternal destiny depends upon the state of one’s soul at the
moment of death, and still deny that God judges.  In other words, the last
moment view itself is separable from any claims about whether God sends
sinners to hell, or whether they send themselves.  This seems like a plausi-
ble enough claim (leaving open the question of its compatibility with
Catholic doctrine).  So if we avoid conflating the last moment view with
any claims about the mechanism of the “judgment” (or lack thereof), then
the last moment view is compatible with non-retributivism, and so, the
objection continues, the last moment view is, thereby, also compatible with
perdurantism.
This still does not do the trick.  The question that has plagued perduran-
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tist last momentism throughout this paper remains, though now in a
slightly different form.  Previously, I’ve argued that it is not just for God to
condemn a person to hell on the basis of one temporal part, when that part
is in no way more real or more important than any others.  The proponent
of non-retributivist perdurantist last momentism (a label which itself calls
out for Divine reprobation), avoids the problem in this formulation, but a
variant of the problem remains.  How can it be just for God to have struc-
tured the assigning of eternal abodes in such a way that a person’s choice
about where to go will be based solely on the state of that person’s soul at
her last moment, when there are so many other moments in that person’s
life that are equally real?  The perdurantist has to give an answer to this
question: if Wendy freely chooses to go to hell because she has died in
mortal sin, how is that better than if she is sent to hell because she has died
in mortal sin?  In either case, God has set things up to run as they do.  In
either case, it is difficult to see how it can be just for the last temporal part
to carry the day, when there are so many others that are just as real.  So I
do not believe non-retributivism helps.
IV
I hope that I have shown adequately that perdurantism is incompatible
with the last moment view.  The point of the paper, however, is to show
that eternalism is incompatible with the last moment view.  So my job is not
yet done.  What remains will go quickly, though, given what’s come
before.  
If eternalism is compatible with endurantism, then the problem with the
last moment view becomes a little different.  On this view, God wouldn’t
be judging just a temporal part of Wendy.  He’d just be judging Wendy,
who would be wholly present before him.  However, it’s difficult to con-
ceptualize exactly how this scenario plays out.  The endurantist eternalist is
wont to say that persons “sweep though” time.  It’s not clear just what this
means.
If the view is that there really are persons somehow wholly present at
every moment at which the person exists, then it runs into exactly the same
problem that perdurance runs into.  For on this view, Wendy would be
wholly present both in 1989 and in 2002, and every time in between.  So
when God judges Wendy at a certain time, there are innumerable other
Wendies out there, just as real as the one facing judgment.  Well, then,
we’ll want to know how it can possibly be just for God to select this
Wendy to judge instead of all the others.  And the arguments against this
view will be just the same as the arguments against the perdurantist last
momentist.
Further, the endurantist eternalist, in order to avoid the problem of tem-
porary intrinsics, has to somehow time-index properties.19 So if Wendy is
in a state of mortal sin at t, and a state of grace at t1, then he Wendy that
stands before God for judgment has both those properties: she has the
property in a state of mortal sin at t, and in a state of grace at t1.  Which one is
God supposed to see as more morally relevant?  And why?
It seems quite clear, then, that if the arguments against the compatibility
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of perdurantism and last momentism are successful, then it is also clear
that last momentism is incompatible with endurantist eternalism.
As a final note, let me point out that, if the last moment view entails pre-
sentism, and Catholicism teaches the last moment view, then Catholic
teaching entails presentism.  However, many philosophers think presen-
tism is incompatible with Divine timelessness;20 and Divine timelessness is
also, or so it seems to me, Catholic dogma.21 If my arguments here are
sound, then, on the assumption that Catholic dogma is consistent (an
assumption I am quite prepared to make), these thinkers are wrong: pre-
sentism is indeed compatible with Divine timelessness.  Now there’s just
the small matter of how.
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NOTES
1. Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶ 1861.  Two clarificatory points
about damnation. First, I shall speak throughout this paper as though I believe
there are people in hell.  Indeed, I know that there is at least one person in
hell—Satan.  I do not know, however, whether there are any human persons in
hell.  My argument, however, depends only upon the possibility of human
beings going to hell..  Second, it has been suggested to me that I should not
speak of people being in hell (or, for that matter, in heaven) now, since people
go to heaven or hell only after the final judgment.  I disagree with this theologi-
cal claim, which seems inconsistent with Catholic doctrine (cf. Catechism of the
Catholic Church, ¶ 1022).  But again, nothing important in my argument turns
on one’s view of whether there are currently people in either heaven or hell.
2. These doctrines are not to be confused with the A theory (or tensed the-
ory) and B theory (or tenseless theory).  The A theory is thought by some to be
identical with presentism, but this is false.  There are A theorists who are not
presentists.  And it looks as though McTaggart himself understood the A theo-
ry to be essentially the “moving spotlight” form of eternalism.    
3. The terminology I use here is David Lewis’s.  Cf. On the Plurality of
Worlds (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), 202.
4. Ibid., 203.   
5. This argument is taken from Trenton Merricks, “Persistence, Parts, and
Presentism,” Nous 33 (1999), 421-438.  See also Merricks, “Endurance and
Indiscernibility,” Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), 165-184; and Dean
Zimmerman, “Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism,” in Metaphysics: The Big
Questions (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), 206-219. 
6. Theodore Sider suggests that perdurance is compatible with presen-
tism, though he notes that nobody accepts this combination.  More important-
ly, he also notes that the definition of perdurance he proposes in order to make
the two views compatible is quite plausibly not perdurantism at all.  Cf. Four
Dimensionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 71-73.
7. This argument is from Merricks, “On the Incompatibility of Enduring
and Perduring Entities,” Mind 104 (1995), 523-531.
8. For arguments that endurantism is incompatible with eternalism, see
Trenton Merricks, “Persistence, Parts, and Presentism,”  “Endurance and
Indiscernibility,” and “On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring
Entities.”   For an argument that the two views are compatible, see Sider, op.
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cit.,  63-68, and 70.
9. If Sider is correct, and perdurance is compatible with presentism, then
my arguments against eternalist perdurance would not apply to that combina-
tion of views. 
10. Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶ 1857.  Bear in mind that it is impossi-
ble for (human) person P to know whether an act committed by Q is a mortal
sin.  P can recognize, for example, that the matter is objectively grave.  But P
has no way to know whether Q has adequate understanding: perhaps Q is
mentally ill in a way that is not discernible to P; such mental illness might
deprive Q of the ability to deliberately and knowingly consent to the sinful act.
It is, of course, possible to construct an example in which someone has commit-
ted a mortal sin.  This is done just as I have done it: by simply stipulating that
the act meets the relevant conditions.  But in the real world, we never know of
anyone’s acts other than our own, if they are mortal sins.   
11. Any mortal sin is a rejection of God.  The sinner may consciously
acknowledge this rejection, or he may not.  For a good treatment of this, see
Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), ch. 16.
12. The word “soul” needn’t mean an immaterial object, and so one need-
n’t accept dualism of any kind in order to affirm all of this. 
13. Cf. Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma (Rockford, IL: Tan
Books and Publishers, Inc., 1974), 114.  I believe that it has been claimed that
insane or mentally retarded people may also be granted this moment of clarity
in which to choose for or against God.  
14. The parable and its explanation are found at Lk 12:35-48.  The parallel is
Mt 24:36-51.  See also Mt 25:1-13, the parable of the ten virgins.  St. Paul offers a
similar warning in 1 Thess 5:1-11, as does St. Peter in 1 Pt 3:8-13.  And St.
Peter’s great admonition to “be sober and watchful” also springs to mind in
this context.  (Cf. 1 Pt 5:8)  One might be tempted to argue that these passages
hardly prove the reality of a place of eternal punishment: these are not con-
vincing prooftexts for the existence of hell.  That may be true, but I am not
using them to prove anything about the existence of hell.  I am assuming that
hell is a real possibility.  Given that assumption, the natural way to read these
passages is as implying that failure to be ready puts one in real danger of
damnation. 
15. Jonathan Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), 25.
16. Ibid., 102.  For Lewis’s view, Kvanvig cites a passage in The Problem of
Pain (New York: Touchstone, 1996). 
17. Retribution appears to me to be authoritatively taught by the Church.
On the reality of Divine judgment, see Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶ 1051,
1022; and Ott, op.cit., 492-494, 475-476.  The Church teaches that there are two
judgments, the Particular and the General.  To assert a self-incarceration view
appears to me to drain these judgments of any kind of, well, judgment.  I must
confess, however, that a somewhat more authoritative interpreter of Catholic
teaching than I—Pope John Paul II—has recently taught, in his general audi-
ence address of July 28, 1999 (which, I note, is not part of the ordinary magis-
terium), what sounds very much like non-retributivism: “(Damnation) is not a
punishment imposed (…) externally by God but a development of premises
already set by people in this life.”  (This translation may be found online at
http://www.petersnet.net/browse/1183.htm.) 
18. Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶ 1033 and 1037.
19. On this point, see Merricks, “Endurance and Indiscernibility.”
20. e.g. Nicholas Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting” in Contemporary
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Philosophy of Religion, S. Cahn and D. Shatz, eds. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), 77-98; and William Lane Craig, God, Time, and Eternity (Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), among many others.
21. It seems to me that the teaching of the Church on God’s immutability,
together with the apparent acceptance of the Boethian notion of eternity
(which would rule out everlastingness) in the definition of God’s eternity, sug-
gest that the Church’s teaching is that God is timeless.  (Cf. Ott, op. cit., 35-37.)  
22. I’m fairly sure that Fr. Brian Shanley is on the right track in his “Eternal
Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas,” American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly 71 (1997), 197-224.  See also his “Eternity and Duration in Aquinas,”
Thomist 61 (1997), 525-548.  
23. My thanks to those who have made suggestions and posed objections.
In particular, I wish to thank Christopher Toner and Donald Musacchio for
good advice on early versions.  William Lane Craig and an anonymous referee
for Faith and Philosophy made a number of very helpful points, some of which
prompted me to make significant changes to the paper.  Trenton Merricks has
read several drafts and offered a great many important suggestions and criti-
cisms.  I’m also grateful to an audience at the Society of Christian Philosophers
Eastern Division meeting in November, 2002, for many insightful questions
and comments about an earlier version of this paper.  Of course, none of these
people can be counted upon to agree with anything I say here.
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